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WAIVING GOODBYE TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION
DEFENSES: WHY UNITED STATES COURTS
SHOULD MAINTAIN A REBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTION OF PRECLUSION AND WAIVER
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION
Christina M Manfredi+
A British citizen wins a judgment in Great Britain against a U.S. citizen.
The British citizen then seeks to collect on the judgment. To do so, he must
bring a claim in the United States for recognition and enforcement of his
judgment'-but this is more complicated than it appears. 2
The foreign plaintiff must make a strategic decision regarding the state in
which to bring his claim. New York, for example, will seek to give his
judgment full recognition and enforcement. 3  Another state, however, might
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1. See Robert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgments: Whose Law?,
70 IOWA L. REV. 53, 58 (1984) ("As an act of government[, a judgment's] effects are limited to
the territory of the sovereign whose court rendered the judgment, unless some other state is bound
by treaty to give the judgment effect in its territory, or unless some other state is willing, for
reasons of its own, to give the judgment effect."). Thus, for a foreign judgment to be enforceable,
a defendant's home court must be willing to recognize and enforce the judgment. See GARY B.
BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CML LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
1009-10 (4th ed. 2007).
Recognition of a judgment and enforcement of a judgment are different concepts. Recognition
occurs "when [a judgment] is given the same effect that it has in the state where it was rendered
with respect to the parties, the subject matter of the action and the issues involved."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 92 (1971). Enforcement occurs "when, in
addition to being recognized, a party is given the affirmative relief to which the judgment entitles
him." Id. Thus, "recognition of a judgment is a condition precedent to its enforcement." Id
(emphasis added).
2. See Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1310, 1310 (1985).
3. See Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 122 (N.Y. 1926)
("'It is the settled law of this state that a foreign judgment is conclusive upon the merits. It can be
impeached only by proof that the court in which it was rendered had not jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the action or of the person of the defendant, or that it was procured by means of fraud
... . The presumption is that the rights and liability of the defendant have been determined
according to the law and procedure of the country where the judgment was rendered."' (quoting
Dunstan v. Higgins, 33 N.E. 729, 730 (N.Y. 1893))).
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decide that before recognizing and enforcing the plaintiffs judgment, it will
first inquire into the procedures that the foreign court used in rendering its
decision.4 The state court may even allow the defendant to rechallenge the
foreign court's initial jurisdiction over him rather than preclude the defendant
from disputing the conclusive foreign judgment.5 Therefore, depending on the
state in which the foreign citizen brings his claim for recognition and
enforcement, he may not be entitled to his award despite the fact that he has
won in a court of competent jurisdiction.6  This is the predicament of
preclusion in foreign litigation.
Guiding the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is the
principle of federalism requiring that any area not specifically preempted by
congressional legislation is left to the states' control.7  Because foreign
judgments are not governed by congressional legislation, they have been
recognized and enforced by the states through the principle of international
comity, which involves the mutual recognition of judgments between nations. 8
4. See, e.g., Agnitsch v. Process Specialists, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 812, 818 (S.D. Iowa
2004) (examining the sufficiency of the foreign court's procedure in a case originating in
Malaysia).
5. See, e.g., id.
6. Compare Johnston, 152 N.E. at 123 (holding that a French judgment should be
recognized and enforced because "[tihe principles of comity should give conclusiveness to such a
judgment"), with Agnitsch, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 814, 821 (inquiring into a foreign court's basis for
personal jurisdiction, despite the fact that the United States defendant submitted to the jurisdiction
of the foreign appellate court when the defendant filed an appeal based on the merits rather than
merely appealing the jurisdictional question).
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
326-27 (1819); THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison). Although federalism helps define the
boundaries between state and federal power, it can create problems when states are left to govern
areas of the law that affect national interests. Cf Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the
Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV.
554, 571 (1995) (The article asserts that federal intervention is justified in cases involving "an
interest belonging to the nation as a whole, as a nation. Obvious examples, drawn from the
sphere of foreign affairs, would be national security and access to international trading
opportunities on favorable terms."). Another example would be the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 1012.
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 284 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "comity" as "[a] practice
among political entities (as nations, states, or courts of different jurisdictions), involving ...
mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial acts"); see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895); BORN& RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 1013.
Comity is often intertwined with the idea of reciprocity, although reciprocity is rarely a
precondition to the United States grant of comity. See Hunt v. BP Exploration Co., 492 F. Supp.
885, 899 (N.D. Tex. 1980) ("There is little justification for judicial imposition of a reciprocity
requirement. . . . [R]equiring reciprocity would arbitrarily penalize 'private individuals for
positions taken by foreign governments and.., such a rule has little if any constructive effect, but
tends instead to a general breakdown of recognition practice."' (quoting Arthur T. von Mehren &
Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1661 (1968))); see also Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 612 F.2d 467, 471-
72 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The difficulty with appellant's argument is that the section of the Uniform
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One exception, however, to recognition and enforcement through the principle
of comity occurs in the context of the personal jurisdiction defense.9
[Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition] Act specifically dealing with the circumstances where
recognition should or may be denied.., makes no mention of reciprocity, and we find nothing in
the Act which authorizes us to read such a prerequisite into the statutory scheme by implication."
(citation omitted)). But see Hilton, 159 U.S. at 228 ("In holding such a judgment, for want of
reciprocity, not to be conclusive evidence of the merits of the claim, we do not proceed upon any
theory of retaliation upon one person by reason of injustice done to another; but upon the broad
ground that international law is founded upon mutuality and reciprocity, and that by the principles
of international law recognized in most civilized nations, and by the comity of our own country,
which it is our judicial duty to know and to declare, the judgment is not entitled to be considered
conclusive.").
Compare the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments with that of domestic
judgments. The recognition and enforcement ofjudgments of one state, by its sister states in the
Union, is governed by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 1010. The Full Faith and
Credit Clause has been implemented by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).
Conversely, the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply to the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. See Van Den Biggelaar v. Wagner, 978 F. Supp. 848, 857 &
n.9 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (distinguishing the recognition of foreign judgments through the principle of
comity from the recognition of sister state judgments through the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
Therefore, mechanisms such as comity are necessary to ensure the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments. See id. at 857.
9. See infra note 41 for an example of the personal jurisdiction exception to the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Personal jurisdiction is also known as "in
personam" jurisdiction. See Tracy 0. Appleton, Note, The Line Between Liberty and Union:
Exercising Personal Jurisdiction over Officials from Other States, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1944,
1948 (2007). The concept of personal jurisdiction refers to "[a] court's power to bring a person
into its adjudicative process .... BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 870. Personal
jurisdiction can be obtained through the defendant's: (1) consent to the jurisdiction; (2) presence
in the jurisdiction; or (3) "minimum contacts" with the jurisdiction. See ROBERT C. CASAD &
WILLIAM B. RICHMAN, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS: TERRITORIAL BASIS AND PROCESS
LIMITATIONS ON JURISDICTION OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS §§ 1-5 (3d ed. 1998); see also
Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (holding that "jurisdiction based on
physical presence alone constitutes due process"); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945) (establishing the rule that "minimum contacts" with a state are sufficient to establish a
presence for purposes of service of process provided that jurisdiction would "not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'); see also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,
733 (1877) ("[T]here must be a tribunal competent by its constitution ... to pass upon the
subject-matter of the suit; and, if that involves merely a determination of the personal liability of
the defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or
his voluntary appearance." (emphasis added)).
The personal jurisdiction requirement is not only a prerequisite for a domestic court's
jurisdiction, but is also a requirement for a foreign court's jurisdiction. See UNIF. FOREIGN
MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(a)(2), 13 U.L.A. 58-59 (2000) [hereinafter
UFMJRA]; see also S.C. Nat'l Bank v. Westpac Banking Corp., 678 F. Supp. 596, 598 (D.S.C.
1987) ("Following these principles, courts will generally recognize and enforce the judgments of
foreign courts if (1) the foreign court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the
defendant in the foreign action had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard; (3) the judgment
was not obtained by fraud; and (4) enforcement will not contravene important public policy."
20081
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Within the framework of the personal jurisdiction defense, the doctrine of
waiver plays an important role.' In both foreign and domestic adjudication, a
defense of personal jurisdiction must be raised at the outset of a claim." If a
defendant fails to raise this defense, then it is deemed waived. 12 A judgment
may then be rendered against him, despite a court's lack of personal
jurisdiction. 13
This discrepancy occurs because the waiver doctrine is not as consistently
applied in the foreign judgment context as it is in the domestic judgment
context.' 4 When presented with a request to recognize and enforce a foreign
judgment, most U.S. courts hold that if a defendant loses a personal
jurisdiction challenge and proceeds to litigate on the merits, he has waived his
personal jurisdiction defense.' 5 Other U.S. courts hold that a defendant is not
(citing Robert B. von Mehren, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the United States, 17 VA. J.
INT'L L. 401, 403 (1977))).
10. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703
(1982) ("Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual
right, it can, like other such rights, be waived."). Waiver is defined as "an intentional
relinquishment of a known right and may be implied from circumstances indicating an intent to
waive. Acts inconsistent with the continued assertion of a right, such as a failure to insist upon
the right, may constitute waiver." Bonnette v. South Carolina, 282 S.E.2d 597, 598 (S.C. 1981)
(citations omitted).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b), (g)-(h); see also Dart v. Balaam, 953 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tex. App.
1997) (stating that under the UFMJRA, "[g]rounds for nonrecognition may be waived if a party
had the right to assert that ground as an objection or defense in the foreign country court but
failed to do so").
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1); see also Ins. Corp. oflr., 456 U.S. at 704 ("[U]nlike subject-
matter jurisdiction, which even an appellate court may review sua sponte, under Rule 12(h),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, '[a] defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person . . . is
waived' if not timely raised in the answer or a responsive pleading.").
13. See Ins. Corp. oflr., 456 U.S. at 704-05.
14. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 1044 ("In [some] cases, U.S. courts will not
enforce a foreign judgment, even though they might enforce a comparable state judgment.").
15. See, e.g., In re Verit Indus., 7 F. App'x 743, 744 (9th Cir. 2001) ("It is true that when a
defendant submits to the jurisdiction of the court 'for the limited purpose of challenging
jurisdiction, the defendant agrees to abide by that court's determination on the issue of
jurisdiction: That decision will be resjudicata on that issue in any further proceedings."' (citing
Ins. Corp. ofJr., 456 U.S. at 706)); Covington Indus. v. Resintex A.G., 629 F.2d 730, 732 (2d Cir.
1980) (holding that when personal jurisdiction is questioned, the enforcing court may render the
judgment void, unless "inquiry into the matter [of personal jurisdiction] is barred by the principles
of res judicata"); Sprague & Rhodes Commodity Corp. v. Instituto Mexicano Del Caf6, 566 F.2d
861, 863 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that if the lower court finds, upon remand, that the defendant
made a special appearance in the court, then he has no right to contest jurisdiction of the foreign
court); Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 441 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding
that a defendant was precluded from raising the jurisdictional issue because he failed to raise it
initially); Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco Co., 470 F. Supp. 610, 615 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (holding that a defendant who voluntarily submits to a court's jurisdiction is precluded
from later raising a jurisdictional challenge); Domingo v. States Marine Lines, 340 F. Supp. 811,
815 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("New York gives conclusive effect to judgments of foreign countries based
on personal jurisdiction .... ").
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precluded from relitigating the jurisdictional issue, thereby implicitly holding
that waiver of a jurisdictional defense has not occurred.1
6
This variance in method occurs, in large part, because there is no uniform
federal rule governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
17
Rather, this area of the law is primarily left to the states, which determine howS•18
to enforce foreign judgments within their own sovereign territories.
16. See, e.g., Agnitsch v. Process Specialists, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 812, 813-14 (S.D. Iowa
2004) (failing to give preclusive effect to a defendant's subsequent appellate litigation on the
merits); Hunt v. BP Exploration Co., 492 F. Supp. 885, 895-96 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (holding that a
defendant's subsequent litigation on the merits is not a jurisdictional waiver); CIBC Mellon Trust
Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp., 743 N.Y.S.2d 408, 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002), aff'd, 792 N.E.2d 155
(N.Y. 2003) ("Since a foreign court's determination that it has personal jurisdiction does not
necessarily comport with the prerequisites of this country's Constitution for such a finding, an
assertion ofjurisdiction by a foreign court should not preclude a challenge here. Such a challenge
is not, in fact, a second bite of the apple on the jurisdiction issue.").
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 cmt. a (1987); BORN &
RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 1011-12; see UFMJRA § 1, 13 U.L.A. 43 (2002) (governing the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in a majority of states because there is no
applicable uniform federal law).
18. See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United
States: In Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 265
(1991) (noting that because a majority of states have not yet adopted the Recognition Act, the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is largely governed by common law).
Arguably, enforcement of foreign judgments is governed by federal common law. See id
Although general federal common law is nonexistent, substantive federal common law exists in a
few specific areas involving "uniquely federal interest[s]," such as the enforcement of foreign
judgments. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 11-12. Even where it exists, however, federal
common law only slightly improves uniformity because federal common law "will be
Fairchildhioned only to prevent 'significant conflict' between state laws and federal policies." Id.
at 12. Further, even if a conflict does exist between state and federal law, federal common law
"will be Fairchildhioned only to the extent necessary to eliminate the conflict." 1d.
Thus, in areas that are traditionally federal, such as enforcement of foreign judgments, the
Court has acted to preempt state law only where there is a significant conflict. Id. For examples
ofjudicial preemption through federal common law, see Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487
U.S. 500, 505-07 (1988), which discusses the preemption of state law in the area of procurement
of military equipment; United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 595-96
(1973), which holds that state law is an inappropriate standard to apply in the area of contracts
entered into by the United States; and Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968), which
determines that federal common law trumps state law in the area of United States foreign
relations.
Additionally, in the area of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, the Court has
specifically said that states should apply their individual laws through the Erie doctrine, which
requires federal courts sitting in diversity to apply state law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also Success Motivation Inst. of Japan Ltd. v. Success Motivation Inst.
Inc., 966 F.2d 1007, 1010 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that state law should have been applied to
determine the preclusive effect of a foreign judgment). As a result of legislative and judicial
reluctance to fashion federal common law for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, federal law largely, though not necessarily, heeds to state law. See BORN &
RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 12 (noting that federal common law is only created to the "extent
necessary to eliminate the conflict"). Thus, although enforcement of foreign judgments is
2008]
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The absence of a federal law or treaty governing recognition and
enforcement allows individual states to interpret the law differently from one
another. 19  Consequently, there is no uniformity to the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments.20  Lack of uniformity creates
unpredictability in the law. It is this unpredictability that is problematic, both
to U.S. citizens and to foreign citizens who try to enforce judgments within the
United States, because it may frustrate the reasonable expectations of litigants
and lead to disparate results across the states.
22
This Comment will examine the implications of a system whereby the
personal jurisdiction defense to recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments is governed by state law. In Part I, this Comment will explore the
practice of recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments. Next, it will compare
how the defense of personal jurisdiction in the area of international judgments
differs from its domestic counterpart. In Part II, this Comment will examine
the four different conclusions courts have reached when analyzing personal
jurisdiction waivers in international litigation. It will consider the merits and
disadvantages of each conclusion through the perspective of the various
interests these court decisions affect.
In Part III, this Comment will address the dilemma stemming from a lack of
uniformity regarding the preclusive effect of foreign judgments. It will assert
that when courts hold that preclusion has not occurred, they are impliedly
holding that waiver has also not occurred. This Comment will argue that non-
preclusion is the wrong approach to recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, both because it breaks with the great weight of case law and
because it allows a defendant to reassert the jurisdictional challenges that he
has previously waived. This Comment will contend instead that a rebuttable
presumption of preclusion should uniformly be adopted. This presumption
would aid standardization of the application of waiver decisions, thereby
promoting stability in the law of recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments.
perhaps governed by federal common law, in all practicality, federal common law more often
than not defers to state law. See id.; see also Brand, supra, at 262-63.
19. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481, cmt. a (1987) ("State
courts, and federal courts applying State law, recognize and enforce foreign country judgments
without reference to federal rules.").
20. See UFMJRA Prefatory Note, 13 U.L.A. 40-41 (2002).
21. Cf Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 484 (2003) (recognizing "the importance
of developing a uniform body of law" in the area of foreign sovereign immunity); Dickinson v.
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999) ("Recognizing the importance of maintaining a uniform
approach to judicial review of administrative action .... "); Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389-90 (1996) (determining that the construction of terms in patents should
be left to the court, not the jury, because of the "importance of uniformity"); Offshore Logistics,
Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 221 (1986) (recognizing the importance of uniformity in
admiralty law).
22. See infra Part II.C for an analysis of the problems associated with unpredictability.
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I. THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: A
HISTORIC TRADITION AND A MODERN PERSPECTIVE
A. Authority to Recognize and Enforce Foreign Judgments
The authority to recognize and enforce sister-state judgments comes from
the U.S. Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause. This clause requires
recognition and enforcement of domestic judgments.24  Because this clause
only governs the recognition and enforcement of judgments between states, the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments must come from other
authority.
25
The first source of guidance on the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments is the principle of international comity. 26 The Supreme Court first
acknowledged this principle in the case of Hilton v. Guyot.27 There, the Court
recognized that:
after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and
under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and
those of other countries, [when] there is nothing to show either
prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it was
sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special
reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect,
the merits of the case should not, in an action brought in this country
28upon the judgment, be tried afresh ....
After this case was decided, the lower federal courts followed the Court's lead
in looking to principles of comity for determinations of whether to enforce
foreign judgments.29
The second source of law governing recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments is the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
23. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
24. Id.; see also BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 1010.
25. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 1011-12. The clause does not apply to foreign
judgments, but only to judgments between sister states. Id.
26. See UFMJRA § 2, 13 U.L.A. 46 (2002) (stating that the Act should apply to "any
foreign judgment that is final and conclusive"); see also BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at
1014-15 (explaining that the principle of comity provides a basis for enforcing foreign
judgments).
27. 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895).
28. Id.
29. See Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440-41 (3d Cir. 1971)
("Comity should be withheld only when its acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to the
interest of the nation called upon to give it effect."); Hunt v. BP Exploration Co., 492 F. Supp.
885, 900 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (using comity as the means to enforce the judgment, rather than
requiring reciprocity); Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009, 1013-14 (E.D. Ark.
1973) (refusing to "impose reciprocity as a condition to giving conclusive effect to a foreign
judgment").
2008]
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(UFMJRA). 30 To date, thirty-one states have adopted this Act.3' In states that
have adopted the UFMJRA, the statute provides a mechanism for the
recognition of foreign money judgments.32 As for the states that have not
adopted the UFMJRA, a third source of law governs recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments: state common law.33
30. UFMJRA § 8, 13 U.L.A. 80. The UFMJRA is not mandatory. See id. § 8, at 80; see
also id. Table of Jurisdictions, at 21. It was "enacted to protect interests of local citizens in
foreign states by encouraging reciprocal accommodation in enforcing judgments." Id. § I n.2, at
46. The UFMJRA only applies to monetary judgments; it is inapplicable to penalties or other
non-monetary judgments. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 483, cmts. a-
e (1987).
Regarding defenses to recognition and enforcement, the UFMJRA states that:
(a) A foreign judgment is not conclusive if
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide impartial
tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
(b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if
(I) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive notice of the
proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the [cause of action] or [the claim for relief] on which the judgment is based is
repugnant to the public policy of this state;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the
parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by
proceedings in that court; or
(6) in the case ofjurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign court was a
seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.
UFMJRA § 4, 13 U.L.A. 58-59 (alterations in original).
Thus, the UFMJRA provides that not all foreign judgments are conclusive or deserve
recognition because some legal systems are incompatible with the United States Constitution's
Due Process requirements. Therefore, it may be necessary for courts to examine the foreign
court's processes even after a final judgment has been rendered against a United States defendant.
See id. Although this leeway is necessary to assure that due process is met, it is this same leeway
that creates the loophole through which courts may reexamine a conclusive foreign determination,
even in cases where such examination is unnecessary.
31. Uniform Law Commissioners, The National Conference on Commissioners of Uniform
State Laws, A Few Facts About the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act,
http://www.nccusl.org./Update/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ufmjra.asp (last visited Nov.
9, 2008); see also UFMJRA § 8, 13 U.L.A. 39; BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 1015.
32. See generally UFMJRA, 13 U.L.A. 43 (providing a statutory scheme for the recognition
of foreign money-judgments).
33. See Franklin 0. Ballard, Turnabout is Fair Play: Why a Reciprocity Requirement
Should Be Included in the American Law Institute's Proposed Federal Statute, 28 HOUS. J. INT'L
LAW 199, 203 (2006) ("[T]he enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States has
traditionally been governed by state common law and the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act.").
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This latter source of authorit derives from the case of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Electric Manufacturing Co.3 There, the Supreme Court held that the
individual laws of the several states, rather than federal laws, apply in
conflicts-of-law cases. 35  This case was pivotal because it meant that when
resolving foreign judgment conflicts, the personal jurisdiction defense would
be applied based on the varying laws of each particular state, rather than
through a uniform federal law. 36 Thus, even though the Full Faith and Credit
Clause does not provide for recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments,37 various other sources supply this authority.
B. Similarities and Worlds ofDifference in Applications of the Personal
Jurisdiction Defense to Domestic and Foreign Judgments
The defenses to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are
similar to their domestic counterparts. 38  In either forum, there are a few
prerequisites in order to raise these defenses. In the context of domestic
judgments, defendants must not be precluded from challenging recognition and
enforcement of a judgment as a result of prior litigation.39 Similarly, in order
34. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
35. Id. at 496. This holding was based on the decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), which required a federal court, sitting in diversity, to apply the laws of
the forum state.
36. See, e.g., Success Motivation Inst. of Japan Ltd. v. Success Motivation Inst. Inc., 966
F.2d 1007, 1010 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that state law should have been applied to determine the
preclusive effect of a foreign judgment); McCord v. Jet Spray Int'l Corp., 874 F. Supp. 436, 438
(D. Mass. 1994) (holding that the effect of the foreign court's judgment upon a defendant will be
determined by applying state law); Hunt v. BP Exploration Co., 492 F. Supp. 885, 892 (N.D. Tex.
1980) (holding that Texas state law applied when determining jurisdiction in a suit brought to
enforce a foreign judgment); see also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
37. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
38. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (2008) (stating the available domestic defenses: lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficiency of process,
and insufficiency of service of process, among others), with UFMJRA § 4, 13 U.L.A. 58-59
(noting the defenses available under the UFMJRA: lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of
personal jurisdiction, lack of due process, and the existence of fraud, among others).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); see also NLRB v. Thalbo Corp.,
171 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[A] judgment in a prior proceeding bars a party ... from
relitigating an issue if... (1) the issues in both proceedings are identical, (2) the issue in the prior
proceeding was actually litigated and actually decided, (3) there was full and fair opportunity to
litigate in the prior proceeding, and (4) the issue previously litigated was necessary to support a
valid and final judgment on the merits."). This concept of preclusion is known as res judicata.
Res judicata, in its broadest sense, encompasses both claim and issue preclusion. Cornell
University Law School, Legal Information Institute, Res Judicata, http://topics.law.comell.edu/
wexlResjudicata (last visited Aug. 28, 2008). Res judicata is defined as "[a]n issue that has been
definitively settled by a judicial decision." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 1336-
37. Res judicata can also be used in its narrower sense, which refers to claim preclusion.
Lawyers.com, Res Judicata, http://research.lawyers.com/glossary/res-judicata.html (last visited
Aug. 26, 2008). In this context, resjudicata can be:
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to preserve their ability to contest recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment, defendants to a foreign proceeding must not be precluded by prior
litigation.40
A second prerequisite to asserting defenses in either the domestic or foreign
context is timing. In order to later contest enforcement, a defendant must have
raised his defense at the outset of the litigation.41 If defenses are not raised
initially, they are deemed waived.
42
After ensuring these prerequisites are met, a court determining recognition
and enforcement may then consider the asserted defenses. In both the
domestic and foreign arenas, the rendering court's lack of personal jurisdiction
over the defendant is one available defense.43  Although the personal
jurisdiction defense is available in both the domestic and foreign contexts, a
substantial variance arises with respect to how it is applied, because the
preclusion jrinciple is not uniformly recognized in cases of foreign
judgments.
Within the context of foreign litigation, lower courts addressing subsequent
litigation's effect on the personal jurisdiction defense have adopted four main
approaches. Some U.S. courts hold that subsequent litigation of a claim on the
merits, after a defendant loses the personal jurisdiction argument, precludes the
[a]n affirmative defense barring the same parties from litigating the second lawsuit on
the same claim, or any other claim arising from the same transaction or series of
transactions and that could have been-but was not-raised in the first suit. The three
essential elements are (1) an earlier decision on the issue, (2) a final judgment on the
merits, and (3) the involvement of the same parties, or parties in privity with the
original parties.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 1337; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS §§ 17, 24 (1982). Throughout this Comment, res judicata will be used in the
narrower sense.
40. See UFMJRA § 5, 13 U.L.A. 73; see also, e.g., Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v.
Prometco Co., 470 F. Supp. 610, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("[Defendant's] actions in the British court
preclude it from the collateral attack on that court's judgment on jurisdictional grounds.").
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b), (g)-(h) (stating the domestic law requirement that a defendant
must raise certain defenses at the outset of litigation or else waive those defenses); see also Dart
v. Balaam, 953 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tex. App. 1997) (stating that under the UFMJRA, "[g]rounds
for nonrecognition may be waived if a party had the right to assert that ground as an objection or
defense in the foreign country court but failed to do so").
42. See UFMJRA § 5, 13 U.L.A. 73.
43. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) (establishing a domestic personal jurisdiction defense). For
the defense of personal jurisdiction in a foreign judgment context, see UFMJRA, § 4(a)(2), 13
U.L.A. 58-59.
44. Compare Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 123 (N.Y.
1926) (holding that a French judgment should be recognized and enforced because "[t]he
principles of comity should give conclusiveness to such a judgment. ... ), with Agnitsch v.
Process Specialists, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 812, 821 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (inquiring into a foreign
court's basis for personal jurisdiction despite the fact that the United States defendant impliedly
submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court by appealing the decision on the merits rather
than merely appealing that court's assertion of personal jurisdiction).
[Vol. 58:233
Waiving Goodbye to Personal Jurisdiction Defenses
•. 45defendant from challenging recognition. Some courts go further, holding that
subsequent litigation on the merits amounts to a waiver of defenses during the
enforcement stage.46 By contrast, other courts hold that subsequent litigation
on the merits of a claim does not preclude a defendant from challenging
recognition.47 Although it is rare to hold that a defendant has not waived his
jurisdictional challenge upon subsequent litigation,48  in holding that a
defendant is not precluded from challenging recognition, these courts are
implicitly permitting a defendant to raise a defense to enforcement that would
otherwise be waived.49 These differing approaches create a lack of uniformity
in the law, consequently causing unpredictability.
50
II. FOUR APPROACHES TO THE EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION ON
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
A. Subsequent Litigation Amounts to Preclusion from Relitigation and Waiver
of the Personal Jurisdiction Defense
Numerous courts have held that if a defendant loses a personal jurisdiction
defense in a foreign court and then proceeds to litigate the claim on the merits,
he is both precluded from relitigating during the recognition stage of the claim
and has waived his personal jurisdiction defense for purposes of challenging
enforcement. 51
1. Preclusion from Relitigation
If a defendant fails to challenge a jurisdictional issue, then the defendant can
later be precluded from raising it.52  In Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia
Chewing Gum Corp., the parties had an agreement that Somportex would
market Philadelphia Chewing Gum's product in Great Britain.53  The
agreement deteriorated, and, as a result, Somportex filed an action for breach
45. See infra Part II.A. 1.
46. See infra Part II.A.2.
47. See infra Part lI.B. 1.
48. See infra Part II.B.2.
49. See infra Part Il.
50. See infra Part 1L.
51. See Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211, 217 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Although the
personal jurisdiction requirement is a 'fundamental principl[e] ofjurisprudence,' without which a
court cannot adjudicate, the requirement of personal jurisdiction, unlike that of subject-matter
jurisdiction, 'may be intentionally waived, or for various reasons a defendant may be estopped
from raising the issue."' (citation omitted)); RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272,
1280 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that "personal jurisdiction is waiveable"). Cf Franklin Nat'l Bank
v. Krakow, 295 F. Supp. 910, 917 (D.D.C. 1969) ("[A] defendant's right to contest jurisdiction is
not waived where he neither appears nor objects to jurisdiction prior to the entry of a default
judgment against him.").
52. See supra note 15.
53. Somportex Ltd v. Phila. Chewing Gum, 453 F.2d 435, 436-37 (3d Cir. 1971).
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of contract against Philadelphia Chewing Gum in Great Britain.54 Philadelphia
Chewing Gum entered a conditional appearance to set aside the summons, but
later decided to forego both its jurisdictional challenge and its motion to
dismiss the summons. The English Court of Appeal held that the appearance
was unconditional, and therefore Philadelphia Chewing Gum had submitted to
the court's jurisdiction. 56 Somportex proceeded to obtain a default judgment
against Philadelphia Chewing Gum.
57
Thereafter, Somportex filed an action in the United States seeking to enforce
its judgment against Philadelphia Chewing Gum.5 8 On appeal, the pertinent
issue was whether the English court had properly examined the basis for
jurisdiction over Philadelphia Chewing Gum. 5 9 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the English court properly determined
that it had jurisdiction over Philadelphia Chewing Gum, and that, because
Philadelphia Chewing Gum was given the opportunity to contest the factual
basis for jurisdiction but failed to do so, the issue was waived. 60 Therefore, the
Third Circuit held that Philadelphia Chewing Gum was precluded from
arguing the issue during the recognition stage, and its motion for summary
judgment was denied. 61 As this case demonstrates, one way a defendant can be
precluded from challenging the jurisdictional issue is by a failure to raise the
jurisdictional defense in the initial forum. 6 2
Another way a defendant can be precluded from raising a jurisdictional
defense is by voluntarily submitting to the court's jurisdiction. This type of
preclusion occurred in Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco Co.
63
There, the plaintiff, Fairchild, Arabatzis and Smith (Fairchild), operated as a
54. Id. at 437.
55. Id. at 437-38. The solicitors informed the court that instead of pursuing its earlier
course of action, Philadelphia Chewing Gum wished to withdraw its counsel's appearance. Id. at
438. The lower English court granted the motion and Somportex appealed. Id.
56. Id. One judge originally upheld the lower court's decision, but was then reversed by the
Court of Appeal in a later proceeding. Id. Philadelphia Chewing Gum did not appeal the court's
decision dismissing its application to set aside the summons. Id. at 438-39. Thus, the court's
order became final. Id. at 439.
An unconditional appearance occurs when a defendant enters a court without placing any
contingencies on his presence before it. See, e.g., id at 437 n.2. In the United States, this is
known as a "general appearance," which results in the waiver of "a party's ability later to dispute
the court's authority to enter a binding judgment against him or her." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 107.
57. Phila. Chewing Gum, 453 F.2d at 439.
58. Id. The district court granted Somportex's motion for summary judgment. Id. The






63. 470 F. Supp. 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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commodity futures commission merchant. 64 Prometco, operating as a middle
man for the defendant Charbit, agreed to sell commodity options for futures
contracts to be performed in the United Kingdom.65  Various commodity
options were purchased, and Fairchild subsequently defaulted on its payments
to Prometco. Prometco then instituted an action in the United Kingdom and
provided notice of the action to Fairchild at its New York offices.
67
Fairchild initially filed a memorandum with the British court stating that,
unless Fairchild applied for and obtained an order setting aside the summons,
its appearance would be unconditional. 68 Thus, it was necessary for Fairchild
to obtain a dismissal of its summons, or Fairchild would be deemed to have
submitted to the court's jurisdiction. 69 Fairchild then sought an order to set
aside the summons, claiming insufficiency of service and lack of personal
jurisdiction. 70 The English court denied Fairchild's motions, finding that the
court had personal jurisdiction and that Fairchild was properly served.7' When
Fairchild failed to appear before the court for a summary judgment proceeding,
the court entered a judgment against it.72
Fairchild then filed suit in New York against Prometco and Charbit, alleging
securities fraud and common law fraud.73 The relevant issue before the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York was what
preclusive effect to give to the British judgment rendered against Fairchild.74
The district court held that Fairchild was precluded from relitigating matters
decided by the British court based on two grounds. 75 First, the court concluded
that because Fairchild had voluntarily appeared for a purpose other than








71. Id. at 613. Although the English court determined that it had jurisdiction, that finding
did not foreclose the matter. Under English law, if a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of
jurisdiction, then the claim can proceed. Id. The defendants are permitted to raise the
jurisdictional issue again at trial or at proceedings for summary judgment. Id. In this case,
Prometco moved for summary judgment, and Fairchild chose not to appear at the summary
judgment proceeding. Id. Default judgment was entered against Fairchild. Id. Further, because
Fairchild did not appear at the summary judgment proceeding, it forfeited its right to rechallenge
the jurisdictional issue under English law. See id.
72. Id.
73. Id at 613-14.
74. Id. at614-15.
75. Id. at 615.
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judgment.76  Second, because Fairchild raised and lost the jurisdictional
defense, and then subsequently litigated on the merits, it was precluded from
contesting jurisdiction in the district court.7 7 Thus, a voluntary submission to a
court's jurisdiction precludes one from subsequently raising a jurisdictional
defense.78
These two cases illustrate how many courts give preclusive effect to foreign
judgments.79 Because waiver frequently goes hand-in-hand with preclusion,8°
courts that give preclusive effect to foreign judgments often take the view that
the party challenging the foreign judgment has also waived his personal
jurisdiction defense.
2. Waiver of the Personal Jurisdiction Defense
In addition to preclusion rulings, courts have often held that when a
defendant raises and loses a jurisdictional challenge, but proceeds to litigate on
the merits, he has waived his jurisdictional defense for purposes of challenging
enforcement. 8 1  Waiver can be unintentional, through one's missteps in
litigation, or it can be intentional, through one's conscious participation in
adjudication.82
The issue of unintentional waiver was addressed in S.C. Chimexim S.A. v.
Velco Enterprises Ltd., when Chimexim, a Romanian corporation, sued Velco,
an American corporation, seeking to have a judgment, originally rendered
76. Id. Fairchild voluntarily appeared for a purpose other than contesting jurisdiction when
it failed to obtain an order dismissing the summons against it; therefore, Fairchild had entered an
unconditional appearance, which is a voluntary submission for jurisdictional purposes. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See supra notes 45, 51 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc., 470 F. Supp. at 615 (discussing the court's
second reason for its holding that the defendant was precluded from challenging enforcement: the
defendant raised and lost a jurisdictional challenge, and then proceeded to litigate the merits of
the claim); see also discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
81. See, e.g., S.C. Chimexim S.A. v. Velco Enters., 36 F. Supp. 2d 206, 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (challenging a ruling on the merits amounts to a waiver of any available personal
jurisdiction defense); Yihye v. Blumenberg, 687 N.Y.S.2d 703, 704 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) ("The
defendant did not move to dismiss the action or interpose any relevant jurisdictional defense
based upon improper service. Thus, the defendant waived any objections to personal jurisdiction
he might have otherwise asserted .... (citation omitted)).
82. See, e.g., S.C. Chimexim S.A., 36 F. Supp. 2d at 215 (noting the defendant's implicit,
unintentional waiver); S.C. Nat'l Bank v. Westpac Banking Corp., 678 F. Supp. 596, 598 (D.S.C.
1987) (noting the defendant's implicit, deliberate waiver where the "party... objects to a court's
jurisdiction, but takes action inconsistent with that objection"). Both of these cases deal with
types of implicit waiver. Although explicit waiver is not the subject of this paper, it is certainly
an additional means whereby a defendant may waive his defense. See Transaero, Inc. v. La
Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 162 F.3d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1998) ("The requirement that a court have
personal jurisdiction is a due process right that may be waived either explicitly or implicitly.").
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against Velco in Romania, enforced in the United States. 83 The underlying
lawsuit arose when Velco failed to meet its financial contractual burden and
Chimexim filed suit in Romania. s4 Velco failed to appear for the proceeding
before the Romanian court,85 and the court entered a default judgment against
Velco.86 On Velco's appeal, the court of appeal affirmed the tribunal.8 7
Chimexim later filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, seeking to have its judgment against Velco enforced.88
On the issue of enforcement, which Velco contested on personal jurisdiction
grounds, the district court determined that Velco had waived its jurisdictional
defense. 89 Specifically, the court found that Velco had voluntarily surrendered
to the Romanian court's jurisdiction by challenging the ruling on the merits
concurrent with raising its jurisdictional defenses during the appeal. 90 Thus,
personal jurisdiction challenges can be waived unintentionally, even when a
defendant raises his defense but does so while simultaneously challenging an
additional claim. 91
Further, a jurisdictional defense may be waived through conscious
92participation in a trial on the merits. For example, in South Carolina
National Bank v. Westpac Banking Corp., the court held that subsequent
litigation on the merits amounts to a waiver of jurisdictional defenses that were
83. S.C. Chimexim S.A., 36 F. Supp. 2d at 207, 209-10. Chimexim, the Romanian
corporation, and Velco, the United States corporation, were both in the business of distributing
chemicals and plastics. Id. at 209. Chimexim had upheld its end of the contract, but Velco had
not finished paying on its contract. Id. As a result, the companies entered into an agreement
setting up a payment schedule that would allow Velco to settle its outstanding account. Id.
84. Id. at 209.
85. Id. at 210. Velco was served with process at its representative office in Romania;
however, Velco denied that its representative office ever received the summons, which was why
Velco failed to appear at the proceeding. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. Romanian tribunals serve as both lower-level appeals courts and as courts of first
impression in administrative and commercial law cases. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
JUDICIAL REFORM INDEX FOR ROMANIA 1 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/rol/
publications/romaniajri_2002.pdf.
At the court of appeal, Velco initially asserted lack of personal jurisdiction, claiming that its
representative office was the incorrect office to represent the company in court. S.C. Chimexin
S.A., 36 F. Supp. 2d at 210. Velco also argued that the initial pleading was "insufficiently
'stamped,"' that there was insufficient service of process, and that the tribunal settled the case
without addressing the merits. Id. After the court of appeal's decision, Velco appealed to the
Supreme Court of Romania, but because the New York court was unaware of the Romanian
appellate court's disposition, it did not address the Romanian Supreme Court proceeding. Id




92. See, e.g., S.C. Nat'l Bank v. Westpac Banking Corp., 678 F. Supp. 596, 599 (D.S.C.
1987). When a jurisdictional defense is implicitly waived, waiver can be through either an
intentional submission to a court's jurisdiction, or an unintended submission. Id.
2008]
Catholic University Law Review
otherwise available to the defendant.93 South Carolina National Bank (SCNB)
had issued a letter of credit and bills of lading to Commonwealth Steel
Company. 94 Through a series of transactions, the letter and bills became the
property of Westpac Banking Corporation (Westpac).95 Upon presentment of
the letter and bills to SCNB, however, SCNB rejected the demand for payment,
asserting that the bills of lading did not satisfy the specified requirements.
96
Westpac demanded payment of the letter of credit and filed suit against
Commonwealth Steel in Australia to recover its investment.97  SCNB was
joined as a defendant, and made a special appearance "to contest the Australian
court's jurisdiction." 98 The Australian court ruled that jurisdiction was proper
over SCNB. 99 Following the court's jurisdictional ruling, SCNB participated
in the full trial on the merits, to which it came out the losing party.
100
SCNB then filed an action in the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina seeking a declaratory judgment that the Australian judgment
93. Id.
94. Id. at 596-97. SCNB provided a letter of credit to Commonwealth Steel Company (an
Australian corporation) on behalf of National Railroad Utilization Corporation in exchange for
products that Commonwealth agreed to ship to National. Id. In order to receive payment,
Commonwealth Steel Company was required to present a set ofbills of lading to SCNB. Id.
A bill of lading is "[a] document that establishes the terms of a contract between a shipper and
a transportation company. It serves as a document of title, a contract of carriage and a receipt for
goods." U.S. Dep't of Transp., Glossary of Shipping Terms, http://www.marad.dot.gov/
Publications/glossary/B.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2008); see also WHARTON POOR, POOR ON
CHARTER PARTIES AND OCEAN BILLS OF LADING 134 (5th ed. 1968).
Commonwealth Steel Company subsequently negotiated the letter and the bills of lading to
Westpac Banking Corp., who in turn, presented the documents to SCNB. S.C. Nat'l Bank, 678 F.
Supp. at 597.
95. S.C. Nat'l Bank, 678 F. Supp. at 596-97.
96. Id. at 597. The bills of lading were subject to requirements set forth in the Uniform
Customs and Practices for Documentary Credit. Id at 596-97. Subject to these requirements, the
bills of lading had to be "clean 'on board' ocean bills of lading," and meet the requirements
thereof. Id. at 597.
An "ocean bill" is simply a bill that prescribes that the method of shipping should be by sea.
RICHARD SCHAFFER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BusINESs LAW AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 152, 160-
62 (6th ed. 2005). "Clean" bills of lading refer to bills that "contain[] no notations by the carrier
that indicate any visible damage to the goods, packages, drums, or other containers being loaded."
Id. at 160. An "on board" bill of lading "states that the goods have actually been loaded aboard a
certain vessel." Id.
97. S.C. Nat'l Bank, 678 F. Supp. at 597.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id The Australian court held that the bills of lading conformed with the requirements in
the letter of credit, and awarded judgment to Westpac. Id. SCNB subsequently appealed the
Australian judgment to the New South Wales Court of Appeal where it contested only the trial
court's decision on the merits, but not the jurisdictional issue that it had initially raised at trial. Id.
The court of appeal reversed, and Westpac filed an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council. Id. The Privy Council reversed the court of appeal, rendering judgment in favor of
Westpac. Id.
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was unenforceable. 10 1 Westpac counterclaimed to enforce the judgment. 10 2
The district court found in favor of Westpac, holding that the Australian courts
had personal jurisdiction over SCNB. 10 3 The court determined that "SCN[B]'s
subsequent conduct [of participating in the trial on the merits] was inconsistent
with the continued assertion of its right to personal jurisdiction .... Instead
SCN[B] appeared to voluntarily submit to the Australian courts' jurisdiction
throughout the litigation process." 4  Thus, because SCNB participated in
litigation on the merits, it waived its right to assert a subsequent personal
jurisdiction challenge.10 5
The above cases demonstrate the position advanced by the majority of U.S.
courts. Namely, when a defendant either fails to raise a jurisdictional issue or
raises, but loses, a jurisdictional challenge and then participates in the trial on
the merits, the defendant is not only precluded from challenging the foreign
court's jurisdiction during recognition, but he has also waived the defense for
purposes of contesting enforcement.'
0 6
B. Subsequent Litigation Does Not Require Preclusion from Relitigation or
Amount to Waiver of a Personal Jurisdiction Defense
As discussed below, some courts have held that when a party loses a
jurisdictional challenge and then litigates on the merits, he is neither precluded
from relitigating the issue during recognition of the judgment, nor is he
deemed to have waived his jurisdictional defenses for purposes of challenging
enforcement of the judgment.
1. No Preclusion from Relitigation
In Agnitsch v. Process Specialists, Inc., a creditor brought an action to
enforce a Malaysian judgment against a U.S. debtor.'0 7 The creditor, Agnitsch,
filed an action in Malaysia for breach of contract against defendant, Process
Specialists, Inc. (PSI)."' PSI, which was served process in its home state of
Texas, contended that the Malaysian court lacked personal jurisdiction over
it.109
101. Id.
102. Id. Westpac also counterclaimed in the alternative for a new judgment on the merits.
Id.
103. Id. at 600.
104. Id. at 599.
105. Id at 599-600.
106. See supra notes 50-51.
107. Agnitsch v. Process Specialists, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 812, 813 (S.D. Iowa 2004).
108. Id. at 814.
109. Id. Both parties then filed affidavits with the Malaysian court in support of their
positions on the contested issue of personal jurisdiction. Id.
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The Malaysian court then ordered PSI to file a defense to Agnitsch's breach
of contract claim."10 PSI appealed the order, but the appeal was denied.11 1 PSI
then failed to file its defense, and the court entered a default judgment against
it. 112 Agnitsch proceeded to file suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa seeking to enforce the judgment against PSI.1 3 The
district court determined that there were genuine issues of material fact
regarding whether the defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with
Malaysia to uphold a finding of personal jurisdiction.' 14  As a result, the
district court denied both motions for summary judgment. 1 5 It is significant
that, in denying the motions, the court overlooked the critical fact that PSI
submitted to the foreign court's jurisdiction by appealing matters unrelated to
the jurisdictional question. 116 The district court thereby implicitly held that the
defendant was not precluded from challenging personal jurisdiction. 117 Thus,
although the court was properly concerned with guaranteeing PSI's due
process rights,' 18 it unnecessarily retried the issue by failing to recognize PSI's





113. Id. at 813. In response, PSI filed a motion to dismiss. Id. The district court determined
that it would treat PSI's motion as one for summary judgment, because both parties had submitted
motions addressing matters outside the scope of the pleadings. Id.
114. Id at 821.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 817-18 (listing various exceptions to the general rule that foreign judgments
are given full faith and credit, but failing to discuss the possibility that a defendant may waive the
personal jurisdiction defense by submitting to the court).
117. See id. Ordinarily, a court would be within its bounds in determining whether to enforce
a judgment of a foreign court by looking to whether the foreign court's proceedings comported
with the U.S. due process guarantees of "fair play and substantial justice." Id at 818 (citing Pure
Fishing, Inc. v. Silver Star Co., 202 F. Supp. 2d 905, 914 (N.D. Iowa 2002)). Arguably, however,
PSI submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court because PSI appealed the Malaysian order
requiring it to file a defense on the merits. Had PSI simply appealed on jurisdictional grounds,
the court's holding would have been entirely correct because the foreign court would not have
reached the merits. Instead, PSI's actions amounted to a submission to the Malaysian court's
jurisdiction and effectively extinguished any due process concerns. Compare id. at 821
(suggesting no waiver based on defendant's challenging on the merits), with S.C. Chimexim SA.
v. Velco Enterprises Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d 206, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that a challenge on
the merits that is raised coextensively with a jurisdictional challenge amounts to a jurisdictional
waiver).
118. See CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp., 743 N.Y.S.2d 408, 418 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2002), aft'd, 792 N.E.2d 155 (N.Y. 2003) ("Since a foreign court's determination that it has
personal jurisdiction does not necessarily comport with the prerequisites of this country's
Constitution for such a finding, an assertion ofjurisdiction by a foreign court should not preclude
a challenge here. Such a challenge is not, in fact, a second bite of the apple on the jurisdiction
issue.").
119. Agnitsch, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 818-21.
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2. No Waiver of the Personal Jurisdiction Defense
Occasionally, a court will hold that subsequent litigation on the merits
neither amounts to preclusion nor waiver of the jurisdictional defense; one
such example is Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. 12° The Hunt case dealt with an
American citizen, named Nelson Bunker Hunt, who was part of a cooperative
venture with BP to develop an oil concession in Libya. Hunt had entered
into an agreement with BP which provided that Hunt would convey to BP a
one-half interest in his concession of a Libyan oil field in exchange for BP's
agreement to p2rovide initial payments, costs of exploration, and costs of
development.
When the Libyan government nationalized the concession, BP filed a suit in
England alleging that because its contract had been frustrated, Hunt had
unfairly obtained a benefit. 123 Hunt declined to accept service of the writ of
summons, and later filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the British court
lacked jurisdiction.' 24 Hunt's objection was overruled and he filed an appeal,
which he then neglected to pursue.125 Instead, he filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas seeking a declaratory
judgment that the judgment rendered against him in England was
unenforceable.126
Trial began on the merits in England, while Hunt's suit was pending in the
United States. 12 7  Judgment was entered against Hunt in the English
120. 492 F. Supp. 885, 895 (N.D. Tex. 1980). This case has since been distinguished on the
ground that:
[b]y maintaining this second action in an American court, Hunt made it clear he did not
submit to the English court's jurisdiction or acquiesce in its judgment. In addition, at
the time of the American decision in Hunt, appeal of the English judgment was still
pending. . . . Hunt had not pursued . . . appeals on the merits without raising an
objection to the foreign court's jurisdiction.
S.C. Nat'l Bank v. Westpac Banking Corp., 678 F. Supp. 596, 600 (D.S.C. 1987).
121. Hunt, 492 F. Supp. at 888.
122. Id. at 888-89.
123. Id. at 889. The contractual frustration claim arose when, during the course of the
venture, the Libyan government nationalized BP's interest in the concession. Id BP later entered
into a settlement agreement with the Libyan government purporting to settle all claims between
BP and Libya arising from Libya's expropriation of BP's oil interests. Id
After Libya nationalized BP's interest, the Libyan government informed Hunt that no further
oil would be delivered to his account. Id. Hunt subsequently entered into a settlement agreement
with Libya, in part, providing that Libya would agree to a final settlement and release of any
claims it may have had against Hunt as BP's successor to the concession. Id.
BP's suit against Hunt alleged "that its contract with Hunt was frustrated when BP's interest in
the concession was expropriated [by the Libyan government], and that, because of BP's




127. Id. at 890.
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proceeding.'28  In the United States, the issue before the district court was
whether the English court had jurisdiction over Hunt, as measured by U.S.
jurisdictional standards.' 29
The court stated that "trying the merits of the British suit after losing the
jurisdictional argument is not a consent to the jurisdiction of the English court
and a waiver of his due process rights to an appropriate forum."'1 30 The court
based this assertion on the idea that if a foreign court's jurisdictional
determination does not satisfy U.S. due process standards, than a due process
defense cannot be precluded during enforcement. 3' Therefore, although the
court ultimately found that the English court did have personal jurisdiction
over Hunt, Hunt was not precluded from relitigating, nor was he deemed to
have waived his jurisdictional challenges.132
Thus, the four approaches to determining recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments advanced by United States courts result in significantly
different outcomes. Because these outcomes have a substantial effect on the
litigants, their interests must be the central focus in developing the correct
standard with which to promote uniformity.
C The Various Interests Affected by Preclusion and Waiver Decisions
Perhaps the best way to assess the benefits and burdens of each judicial
approach is to examine them through the perspective of the interests affected.
This interest-balancing is logical because the structure of the mechanism used
to recognize and enforce foreign judgments, comity, is a judicial tool
inherently based on balancing.
33
The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is based on a system
that encompasses the importance of assuring comity to international
judgments, while conditioning that comity on a defendant's opportunity to be
afforded due process rights in a foreign forum.' 34  The recognition and
128. Id. Both Hunt and BP appealed the English judgment, but the appeal had not been
decided at the time of the United States proceeding. Id.
129. Id at 895.
130. Id.
131. See id.; see also BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 1058.
132. Hunt, 492 F. Supp. at 896-98.
133. See, e.g., 30 AM. JUR. 2D Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 673 (2005) ("If a
judgment rendered by a court of another state does not fall within the protection of the full faith
and credit provision of the Federal Constitution, recognition may be accorded such judgment
under the doctrine of comity, unless such judgment was obtained in the absence of due process."
(footnotes omitted)).
134. See UFMJRA § 4, 13 U.L.A. 58-59 (2002); see also Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, 295 A.2d 519,
522 (Conn. 1972) ("[J]udgments of courts of foreign countries are recognized in the United States
because of the comity due to the courts and judgments of one nation from another. Such
recognition is granted to foreign judgments with due regard to international duty and
convenience, on the one hand, and to rights of citizens of the United States and others under the
protection of its laws, on the other hand.").
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enforcement of foreign judgments therefore innately involves interest-
balancing.13 5 Consequently, it is logical to apply an interest-balancing formula
in determining the mechanism that should be used to remedy the preclusion
problem.
1. The Common Interests of Both the Parties and the System
The first class of rights at stake involves the rights of individual parties to a
lawsuit. Plaintiffs and defendants have an interest in the finality of judgments,
whether those judgments are rendered domestically or internationally. 36 The
Supreme Court recognized in Montana v. United States that "[a]pplication of
[res judicata] is central to the purpose for which civil courts have been
established, the conclusive resolution of disputes within their jurisdictions."'137
Finality is important because it allows both the parties and the judicial system
to proceed, rather than maintaining suits indefinitely, disputing facts decided
by an "infallible" judge.138
Further, the parties have an interest in finality because it will, to some
degree, protect the parties from "the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits."
'1 39
Because lawsuits can be financially burdensome, it is beneficial for all parties
that the process is as short in duration as possible. 40 This is especially true
where parties may face suit abroad. The increased costs of defending a lawsuit
in a foreign country, coupled with the costs of a subsequent suit in the United
States during the recognition and enforcement stages, often make international
suits more expensive than domestic suits.
141
135. See, e.g., Livaitis, 295 A.2d at 522.
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 1, Introduction 10-11 (1982); see also S.
REP. No. 93-1277, at 14 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7060 ("Public policy
requires a finality to litigation.").
137. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
138. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."); see also
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, ch. 1, Introduction 10-11 (1982).
139. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S.
147, 153-54 (1979)).
140. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Legal Reform:
The High Costs of Lawsuit Abuse (Jan. 5, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2005/01/20050105-2.html (urging Congress to pass medical liability reform legislation to
reduce the cost of litigation); see also O-Gon Kwon, The Challenge of an International Criminal
Trial as Seen from the Bench, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 360, 369 (2007) ("[R]es judicata aims at
relieving the parties involved in the proceedings of the cost and annoyance of multiple lawsuits
.... 1).
141. See The Honourable J.J. Spigelman, Chief Justice of New South Wales, Address to the
Sixteenth Inter-Pacific Bar Association Conference: Transactional Costs and International
Litigation (May 2, 2006), available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/SupremeCourt/
llsc.nsf/pages/SCOspigelmanO205O6 (stating that additional legal complexities and added costs
of enforcing international judgments are two of the expenses that make transaction costs higher in
the context of international litigation); cf Sandra Day O'Connor, Commentary, Broadening Our
Horizons: Why American Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, 45 FED. LAw. 20, 21 (Sept.
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In addition, the judicial system has an interest in finality, apart from
avoiding an indefinite continuation of the process. The less often that parties
dispute issues that have been resolved, the more judicial resources are
conserved. 1
42
Because finality is an important value of our system, 143 mechanisms like
preclusion that help to promote this value should be favored. Preclusion
reinforces the goals of finality by estopping parties from relitigating their
claims. 144 Alternatively, denying preclusion to foreign judgments frustrates the
goal of finality by extending the cost, uncertainty, and burden on the parties
and the judicial system.
2. The Individual Interests of Both the Parties and the System
Although defendants, plaintiffs, and the judicial system may share a
common interest in the finality of judgments, the parties and the judicial
system have divergent, and sometimes competing, interests as a result of their
positions in the litigation. Defendants, for example, have an interest in being
afforded the same, or comparable, due process rights in a foreign suit to which
they would be entitled in a domestic suit. 145 This is the very reason several
courts refuse to provide preclusive value to foreign judgments-not all foreign
1998) ("[S]tudying the law of other countries can reduce the costs of transnational litigation....
[P]arties may seek judicial remedies in the fora of several nations. By coordinating the rules that
govern cross-border judicial proceedings, we can cut down on the time and expense of
multinational litigation."); Glanville Williams, Liability for Independent Contractors, 14
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 180, 196 (1956) ("[L]itigation in itself entails an economic loss to the parties
and to society, so that a rule that needlessly extends the number of persons involved, and
therefore the complexity of the litigation, is open to objection.").
142. Allen, 449 U.S. at 94; see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979)
("Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of protecting
litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of
promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added)).
143. See Allen, 449 U.S. at 94.
144. See id. (discussing the benefits of finality in the judicial system).
145. See Montrd D. Carodine, Political Judging: When Due Process Goes International, 48
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1182-84 (2007) (discussing Judge Posner's statements in Society of
Lloyd's v. Ashenden, regarding the "international concept of due process" (quoting Society of
Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000))); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 482(l)(a) (1987) ("A court in the United States may not recognize a
judgment of the court of a foreign state if: (a) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system
that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of law .... ");
Michael Wallace Gordon, Forum Non Conveniens Misconstrued: A Response To Henry Saint
Dahl, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 141, 166 (2006) ("If a foreign judgment is rendered in a
fair process that provided due process, the judgment will be enforced in the United States.").
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judicial systems afford defendants the constitutional protections United States
citizens are guaranteed in domestic suits.
146
Another interest at stake is the defendants' interest in predictability of the
system. If defendants cannot predict how a particular court will resolve an
issue, then it may be hard (if not impossible) to tell when certain conduct may
result in judgments against them.14 7
In the context of international judgments, defendants have an interest in
knowing what conduct amounts to preclusion and waiver of jurisdictional
defenses. 148 If defendants cannot tell what conduct is going "beyond objecting
to jurisdiction,"'' 49 then defendants may either unintentionally waive their
jurisdictional objections, or in the alternative, not raise them at all.'50  In other
words, unpredictability could have a "chilling effect" by deterring a defendant
from raising a defense, even if his defense is valid, because of the unknown
consequences that would arise from such action. Further, it may not be
obvious to a defendant when his chance to assert a constitutional right actually
occurs. Does it occur at the time of action in a foreign court, or does it occur at
the time of action in a U.S. court?' 52 Under the current system, the defendant
is faced with an untenable choice-raise the right in the foreign court and risk
submitting to its jurisdiction, or raise the right in a domestic court and risk
being precluded from litigating that right.
53
146. See UFMJRA § 4, 13 U.L.A. 58-59 (2002) (providing that a court may deny the
preclusive effect if the foreign tribunal did not have "procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law").
147. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts Restatement (And a
Proposal for Torts Conflicts), 75 IND. L.J. 437, 447 (2000) (noting widespread unpredictability in
the field of conflicts law); see also EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.26 (3d ed.
2000) (noting that the consequences of unpredictability in American conflicts law are
"[c]ontradictory results in the case law, confusion, and... [a] 'homeward trend').
148. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 1058; see also CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v.
Mora Hotel Corp., 792 N.E.2d 155, 160-62 (N.Y. 2003) (examining the preclusive effect of New
York's law on recognizing foreign judgments).
149. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 1058.
150. See supra note 80 for examples of cases in which litigants effectively waived their
jurisdictional objections.
151. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (discussing that
uncertain rules regarding what conduct violates the law will result in a "chilling effect" in the
context of the First Amendment's free speech guarantees). This "chilling effect" often occurs in
the free speech context, in which the Court is concerned with a defendant who does not speak
about a certain issue, regardless of the truth of his speech, for fear of the repercussions. See N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
152. See S.C. Nat'l Bank v. Westpac Banking Corp., 678 F. Supp. 596, 599 & nn.3-4 (D.S.C.
1987) (discussing defendant's confusion regarding whether to assert jurisdictional defenses).
153. Cf BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 1058 ("This approach requires defendants to
choose between having a U.S. court resolve jurisdictional challenges and having an opportunity to
defend against the plaintiff's claims on the merits.").
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Furthermore, in either the domestic or the international context, plaintiffs
have an interest in enforcing all judgments that might be awarded. 54 Because
plaintiffs would presumably like to collect their judgments in an expedient and
efficient manner, prolonging litigation by relitigating conclusive issues only
delays this relief.'
Additionally, the judicial system has its own interest in predictability.
Where two different theories on preclusion and waiver persist, the
predictability of the judicial system declines. The judicial system benefits
from predictability, because predictability helps determine the precedent to
which a court should adhere,' 56  and it "encourage[s] reliance on
154. See Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. 171, 173 (2004) (stating
that a plaintiff has "obvious interests in enforcing [a] judgment"); see also Kevin M. Clermont,
Common-Law Compulsory Counterclaim Rule: Creating Effective and Elegant Res Judicata
Doctrine, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1745, 1748 (2004) (discussing the conclusions flowing from
the plaintiffs property interest in a judgment); Benjamin L. Liebman, Innovation Through
Intimidation: An Empirical Account of Defamation Litigation in China, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 33,
92 (2006) ("[P]Iaintiffs are more interested in money damages than in a printed apology.").
155. See Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law: The Impact of
Applying Foreign Law in Transnational Tort Actions, 51 WAYNE L. REv. 1161, 1192 (2005)
(noting that one advantage to litigating in the United States, as opposed to other nations, is the
"efficient enforcement ofjudgments"). The longer litigation is prolonged, the longer a plaintiffs
compensation is delayed. Compare Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60, 61 (2d Cir.
1991) (noting that litigation in the case ofln re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), ultimately resulted in a judgment of $470 million for plaintiffs), with Indians Remember
Industrial Disaster, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 4, 2004, at A8 (reporting that bureaucratic delays have
denied fund disbursement to Indian victims for almost twenty years), and Alex Perry, Bhopal: 20
Years After, TIME, Nov. 29, 2004, available at http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,
832302,00.html (outlining the struggle it has been for victims to receive more than minimal
compensation, or compensation at all), and David Rohde, Compensation for Bhopal Victims,
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at A6 (discussing an Indian Supreme Court ruling that held that
"compensation should be distributed directly to the victims and no longer held by the
govemment").
156. See, e.g., Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 121 n.2 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("The interests in finality, predictability, and comity underlying our new rule jurisprudence may
be undermined to an equal degree by the invocation of a rule that was not dictated by precedent
. .. " (quoting Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228 (1992))). For example, circuit splits occur
when the Supreme Court has not yet spoken on an issue; therefore, the individual circuits have no
mandatory precedent (at least, not from a higher court), to which to adhere. Thus, the circuit
courts may determine the resolution of an issue by their own accord. These individual
determinations create circuit splits. Once the Supreme Court does resolve a split, however, the
circuits are then bound to follow Supreme Court precedent, eliminating confusion as to which law
to apply in their resolution of an issue. See Environmental Law Institute, Glossary of General
Legal and Constitutional Terms, http://www.endangeredlaws.org/resourceguideglossary.htm (last
visited Aug. 21, 2008).
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adjudication."' 157  Thus, when an area of law is unpredictable, the judicial
system suffers. 1
58
Last, the United States as a whole, and the states individually, have interests
in consistent resolutions of the preclusion and waiver issues. 159 The UFMJRA
was initially proposed because:
[j]udgments rendered in the United States have in many instances
been refused recognition abroad either because the foreign court was
not satisfied that local judgments would be recognized in the
American jurisdiction involved or because no certification of
existence of reciprocity could be obtained from the foreign
government in countries where existence of reciprocity must be
certified to the courts by the government. Codification by a state of
its rules on the recognition of money-judgments rendered in a foreign
court will make it more likely that judgments rendered in the state
will be recognized abroad.
160
Thus, by enforcing the judgments rendered in foreign jurisdictions, the federal
government and the states stand to benefit because it is more likely that foreign
countries will enforce the judgments rendered in the United States against
foreign citizens.1
6 1
III. THE BENEFITS FLOWING FROM PRECLUSION AND WAIVER ARE
FRUSTRATED BY COURTS THAT Do NOT ADHERE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF
PRECLUSION
As the case law demonstrates, although many courts maintain a presumption
of preclusion,' others do not.' 63 When the law lacks uniformity, it also lacks
157. Estabrook v. United States, 41 Fed. CI. 283, 289 (1998) ("'Collateral estoppel ...
"prevent[s] inconsistent decisions, [and] encourage[s] reliance on adjudication .... (quoting
United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984))).
158. Cf id. If reliance on adjudication is encouraged by promoting consistent decisions,
then, logically, the converse is true. Arguably then, the Estabrook case could be understood to
stand for the proposition that reducing consistency between decisions effectively discourages
reliance on adjudication by litigants. Cf id.
159. See UFMJRA Prefatory Note, 13 U.L.A. 40 (2002) (explaining the importance of
reciprocity in achieving enforcement of U.S. judgments abroad).
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Pure Fishing, Inc. v. Silver Star Co., 202 F. Supp. 2d 905, 911 (N.D. Iowa
2002) ('Codification by a state of its rules on the recognition of money-judgments rendered in a
foreign court will make it more likely that judgments rendered in the state will be recognized
abroad."' (quoting UFMJRA Prefatory Note, 13 U.L.A. 40 (1962))). The theory advanced by the
UFMJRA is thus one of reciprocity; however, reciprocity by a foreign state is not a prerequisite to
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in the UFMJRA. In fact, the drafters of the
UFMJRA "consciously rejected reciprocity as a factor to be considered in recognition of foreign
money judgments." Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 612 F.2d 467, 471 (9th Cir. 1980).
162. See supra Part II.A.
163. See supra Part I.B.
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predictability. 164 Lack of predictability is, in turn, detrimental to citizens of
foreign countries, 165 citizens of the United States, 166 and to the United States as
a country.1
6 7
164. See Sadler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. C07-995Z, 2007 WL 2778257, at *7
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 20, 2007) (noting the forum state's interest in protecting its citizens from both
a lack of predictability and a lack of uniformity in results); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. c (1971) (discussing the rationale behind conflicts law, and placing
emphasis on the "policy favoring uniformity of result"); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) (arguing that the rules of law are important
for the promotion of both uniformity and predictability of law); Hector G. Bladuell, Note, Twins
or Triplets?: Protecting the Eleventh Amendment Through a Three-Prong Arm-of-the-State Test,
105 MICH. L. REV. 837, 846 (2007) ("The lack of uniformity does not promote predictability in
judgments and allows judicial fishing expeditions for factors or criteria that support a particular
result.").
165. See, e.g., Michael Traynor, Conflict of Laws, Comparative Law, and The American Law
Institute, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 391, 393 (2001) ("Recognition and enforcement of foreign country
judgments has been governed by a relatively stable principle of finality accompanied by comity,
particularly as applied to money judgments."). Therefore, it follows that finality will often be
thwarted when the principle of comity is not realized. This is detrimental to the countries
involved, as needless litigation wastes valuable judicial resources, and also to the foreign-
plaintiff, because any judgment to which he is entitled is delayed. See, e.g., Mast, Foos & Co. v.
Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900) ("Comity is not a rule of law, but one of practice,
convenience and expediency. It is something more than mere courtesy, which implies only
deference to the opinion of others, since it has a substantial value in securing uniformity of
decision, and discouraging repeated litigation of the same question.").
166. Cf Nicol v. Tanner, 256 N.W.2d 796, 800-01 (Minn. 1976) ("[J]udgments are enforced
to bring an end to litigation so that the rights of parties might finally be determined and judicial
energies might be conserved."). Lack of predictability is detrimental to United States citizen-
defendants because, depending on the jurisdiction in which recognition and enforcement are
being sought, the defendant may or may not be afforded the opportunity to relitigate his claims.
See id This poses a forum shopping problem, in which a foreign-plaintiff could theoretically
seek to enforce a judgment in a state that strictly follows principles of comity. Conversely, a
defendant is almost left with a luck-of-the-draw scenario, whereby his ability to relitigate, rightly
or wrongly decided, could depend on the state in which the plaintiff seeks enforcement. See John
A.E. Pottow, The Myth (and Realities) of Forum Shopping in Transnational Insolvency, 32
BROOK. J. INT'L LAW 785, 815 n.127 (2007) ("'[F]orum shopping is defined as the search by a
plaintiff for the international jurisdiction most favourable to his claims .... However, where
forum shopping leads to unjustified inequality between the parties to a dispute with regard to the
defence of their respective interests, the practice must be considered and its eradication is a
legitimate legislative objective."' (quoting Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer at
71-73, Case C-1/04, Susanne Staubitz-Schreiber, 2006 E.C.R. 1-701, http://eurlex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004C0001 :EN:HTML)); see also Brand, supra note
18, at 317 ("So long as we have issues of international law being determined in both federal and
state courts, we run the risk of application of different interpretations of the rules and a resulting
promotion of forum shopping.").
167. See Brand, supra note 18, at 322 (arguing that a uniform federal rule would "create
greater possibility that a United States judgment would be enforced in a foreign court .... [It]
would make it easier to prove that a United States federal court would enforce a judgment of the
foreign jurisdiction, thus facilitating satisfaction of foreign court reciprocity requirements."); cf
Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1355 (6th Cir. 1992) ("The issuance of
antisuit injunctions threatens predictability by making cooperation and reciprocity between courts
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There are numerous problems inherent in a system that lacks uniformity and
predictability of the law.' 68 Unfortunately, courts that do not give preclusive
effect to foreign judgments are only promoting this system.' 69
When courts refuse to give preclusive effect to the recognition of a foreign
judgment, they open the case for reexamination.1 70 In so doing, the implication
is that a defendant has not waived his right to assert a jurisdictional defense.
The conclusion that follows from a court's decision to reconsider a judgment
on a jurisdictional challenge is that the defendant has not waived his defense.
If the defendant had waived his defense, then the court would not be
empowered to reexamine the jurisdictional challenge. 17
A court's refusal to apply a presumption of preclusion to foreign judgments
is tantamount to an implicit refusal to recognize waiver. This is not only
contrary to the majority of cases, but also hinders predictability in the judicial
system. 172 To remedy this problem, all U.S. courts, state and federal, should
maintain a rebuttable presumption of preclusion when deciding whether to
recognize and enforce foreign judgments. If this presumption is uniformly
of different nations less likely. In this regard, antisuit injunctions are even more destructive of
international comity than, for example, refusals to enforce foreign judgments. At least in the
latter context foreign courts are given the opportunity to exercise their jurisdiction. Antisuit
injunctions, on the other hand, deny foreign courts the right to exercise their proper jurisdiction.
Such action conveys the message, intended or not, that the issuing court has so little confidence in
the foreign court's ability to adjudicate a given dispute fairly and efficiently that it is unwilling
even to allow the possibility. Foreign courts can be expected to reciprocate such disrespect.
Reciprocity and cooperation can only suffer as a result."). Therefore, a lack of predictability has
negative consequences for both the United States and its several states for reasons of reciprocity.
Although the bulk of United States jurisdictions do not require reciprocity as a prerequisite for the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, the same may not be true of foreign
reciprocity requirements. If some states deny the preclusive effect of foreign judgments, then
likely, those foreign countries will refuse the preclusive effect of United States judgments. See
Brand, supra note 18, at 322. This would frustrate the entire purpose behind the creation of the
UFMJRA, that of assuring the recognition and enforcement of United States' judgments abroad.
See UFMJRA, 13 U.L.A. 40, Prefatory Note (2002).
168. See discussion supra Part II.C (discussing the detriments to a system that lacks
predictability and uniformity in the law).
169. Cf JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 118-20 (1930) (contending that
predictability in law is unattainable because the legal system lacks finality).
170. Cf Cole v. Young, 817 F.2d 412, 431 (7th Cir. 1987) ("We may not reexamine a
decision of a state court on the ground that it is inconsistent with some earlier case; forbidding
such inquiry is what preclusion is all about. Principles of preclusion apply even after it has been
authoritatively established that a decision was wrong.").
171. Cf Gaston v. Ploeger, No. 04-2368, 2008 WL 169814, at *5 n.12 (D. Kan. Jan. 17,
2008) ("This fact [eventually raising an issue as to the court's jurisdiction], however, fails to
revitalize a personal jurisdiction defense that already has been waived .... [T]he waiver of the
defense of lack of personal jurisdiction ... is absolute." (emphasis added)).
172. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (noting that lack of uniformity creates
unpredictability in the law).
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adopted, the problems associated with lack of predictability would be greatly
alleviated.1
73
Although one could advocate for an irrebuttable presumption, a rebuttable
presumption assures that the interests at stake will be afforded due
consideration.174  Because recognition of foreign judgments is conditioned
upon the foreign government's conferral of due process rights to U.S.
defendants, 175 it would frustrate this condition to require an irrebuttable
presumption, by which a defendant would be permanently barred from
demonstrating that he was not afforded his due process rights. 17 6  Thus, by
providing for a rebuttable presumption, stability can be created while U.S.
concerns can be assured.
Moreover, although there are some detriments to adopting this rebuttable
presumption, these can be mitigated. For jurisdictions that currently maintain
presumptions of preclusion, the confusion experienced by some defendants as
to when and how to assert their rights is one detriment to the preclusion
173. Cf Daniel Tan, Antisuit Injunctions and the Vexing Problem of Comity, 45 VA. J. INT'L
L. 283, 304 (2005) ("This predictability, in turn, depends on cooperation, reciprocity, and respect
among nations. That helps to explain the enduring need for a presumption-albeit a rebuttable
one-against the issuance of international anti-suit injunctions.").
174. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 134 cmt. a (197 1) (noting
that in choice of law cases, a rebuttable presumption establishes the party that must carry the
evidentiary burden of production); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 96 cmt. i (1942) (discussing
the notion that a rebuttable presumption establishes a "middle ground" with regard to fairness to
all concerned parties). Thus, in other contexts, rebuttable presumptions are frequently utilized in
order to allocate the benefits and burdens of litigation.
175. See UFMJRA Prefatory Note, 13 U.L.A. 58-59 (2002); see also S.C. Nat'l Bank v.
Westpac Banking Corp., 678 F. Supp. 596, 597-98 (D.S.C. 1987) ("'[W]here there has been
opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the
trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and
under a system ofjurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration ofjustice between the
citizens of its own country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show either
prejudice in the court or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the
judgment, or any other special reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect,
the merits of the case should not, in an action brought in this country upon the judgment, be tried
afresh, as on a new trial or an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that the judgment was
erroneous in law or in fact."' (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895))).
Thus, comity governs unless the system in which the judgment was rendered does not afford a
defendant due process guarantees. Because of this condition, a court must have some way to
inquire into whether due process was, in fact, guaranteed. A rebuttable presumption would
provide a court with the means to make this inquiry.
176. See Ariel Katz, Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and Market
Power, 49 ARiz. L. REv. 837, 888 (2007) ("Some presumptions are 'conclusive' or 'irrebuttable,'
meaning that a proof of the basic fact mandates a conclusion of another fact, despite evidence to
the contrary. In such cases, evidence to the contrary is irrelevant and will therefore not be
admissible.").
[Vol. 58:233
Waiving Goodbye to Personal Jurisdiction Defenses
presumption. 177 This lack of clarit, however, is often easily remedied by the
courts' use of a bright-line rule. To ensure a bright-line rule, the courts
should require that any conduct inconsistent with asserting jurisdictional
challenges amounts to waiver of the challenge.' 
79
Another argument against the presumption of preclusion is that the
presumption would undermine the government's interest in ensuring that
constitutional due process guarantees are afforded to U.S. litigants defending
in foreign courts. 0 This due process interest is certainly not to be taken
lightly; however, this concern can be minimized if the courts apply the
preclusion presumption only to those cases arising within legal systems that
provide comparable due process rights to litigants. 81 For systems in which
due process or similar rights are not afforded, the courts should have the
authority to ensure that due process rights have been protected. 182 This could
be accomplished through the adoption of a rebuttable presumption of
preclusion.
Thus, although the due process concerns are valid, they do not
counterbalance the interests the same parties have in finality, especially when
the due process concerns can be easily remedied while maintaining a rebuttable
presumption of preclusion. 83 Predictability is perhaps the greatest asset of our
system. When strides can be made to assure predictability at little expense
177. See supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text (discussing how defendants to foreign
litigation experience confusion in asserting their rights because of the timing and methodology
requirements under the current system).
178. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 1057-58 (noting that many courts take the
position that litigation on the merits is tantamount to waiver).
179. See, e.g., FDIC v. Niblo, 821 F. Supp. 441, 451 (N.D. Tex. 1993) ("[W]aiver is the
voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or intentional conduct inconsistent with
claiming that right."); CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp., 792 N.E.2d 155, 162 (N.Y.
2003) ("When defendants applied to the High Court to set aside the English judgments and to
defend on the merits, they did more than they had to do to preserve a jurisdictional objection...
and so they voluntarily appeared in the foreign proceeding ... .
180. See UFMJRA § 4, 13 U.L.A. 58-59 (2002).
181. See Hunt v. BP Exploration Co., 492 F. Supp. 885, 894-95 (N.D. Tex. 1980) ("Where,
as here, the rendering forum's system ofjurisprudence has been a model for other countries in the
free world, and whose judges are of unquestioned integrity independent of the political winds of
the moment, the judgment rendered is entitled to a more ministerial, less technocratic, recognition
decisional process .... But the elements of the prima facie case are more likely to be met and it is
less likely that such prima facie cases would be rebutted for judgments from favored systems.").
182. See UFMJRA § 4, 13 U.L.A. 59 cmt. ("As indicated [by the Supreme Court in Hilton], a
mere difference in the procedural system is not a sufficient basis for non-recognition. A case of
serious injustice must be involved.").
183. See Xiao Yang Chen v. Fischer, 843 N.E.2d 723, 725 (N.Y. 2005) ("The primary
purposes of res judicata are grounded in public policy concerns and are intended to ensure
finality, prevent vexatious litigation and promote judicial economy.").
184. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party
Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1202 (2000) ("While a court's opinion
certainly impacts the litigants before it, the opinion also becomes a component of the public good
2008]
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to the rights and interests of the parties involved, the scales tip in favor of the
presumption of preclusion.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts that refuse to maintain a presumption of preclusion in the process of
recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments inherently are ignoring waivers
. . .. 185 . .
of jurisdictional defenses. This implicit disregard for waiver decisions
breaks with the great weight of precedent and authority, and frustrates the goal
of predictability in the law.' 86 There exists a pressing need for uniformity of
the system because uniformity promotes predictability.1 87  To enhance
uniformity, all U.S. courts, state and federal, should maintain rebuttable
presumptions of preclusion that would prohibit relitigation of foreign
judgments during the recognition and enforcement stages. This is one way of
adding clarity to a vastly complex area of foreign judgments that is only
expanding in a world that is becoming ever more globally interconnected.
188
known as precedent, and benefits society as a whole by increasing the predictability of legal rules,
thereby allowing for more efficient private ordering."). In other words, when precedential law
has a clear application, courts will uniformly apply the precedent, creating greater predictability.
185. See discussion supra Part I I.B (providing examples of situations in which courts ignore
waivers ofjurisdictional defenses by their refusals to adhere to presumptions of preclusion).
186. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 6, cmt. c (1971) (describing
factors relevant to choice of law decisions, including "certainty, predictability and uniformity of
result").
187. See id. (discussing the rationale behind the law, and placing emphasis on the "policy
favoring uniformity of result").
188. See Edward Iwata, Foreign Firms May See More Lawsuits, Shareholders May File
More Fraud Cases, USA TODAY, Oct. 23, 2007, at 3B ("Litigation involving foreign companies
reflects the global explosion of financial markets and multinational corporations ...."); see also
Mary K. Kane, Dean, U.C. Hastings Coll. of the Law, Globalization and Cross-Border Litigation,
Talk Delivered at Guam/Palau Judicial Conference (August 2000), in GLOBAL JURIST TOPICS,
2001, at 1.
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